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Dr. Robert M. Wachter is Professor and Associate Chair of
the Department of Medicine at the University of California, San
Francisco, where he directs the 60-physician Division of Hos-
pital Medicine. Author of 250 articles and 6 books, he coined
the term “hospitalist” in 1996 and is generally considered the
“father” of the hospitalist ﬁeld, the fastest growing specialty in
the history of modern medicine. He is past president of the
Society of Hospital Medicine (1999–2000) and past chair of the
American Board of Internal Medicine (2012–2013). In 2004, he
received the John M. Eisenberg Award, the nation's top honor
in patient safety. For the past seven years, Modern Healthcare
magazine has named him one of the 50 most inﬂuential
physician-executives in the U.S., the only academic physician
to receive this recognition. His new book, The Digital Doctor:
Hope, Hype and Harm at the Dawn of Medicine's Computer Age,
was published in April, 2015
Healthcare: What are you learning each day about local and
national healthcare delivery as the events surrounding Ebola
unfold?
Wachter: I'm not a public health expert, but it does expose the
degree to which we are not prepared for this kind of thing. We all
knew that the public health system and infrastructure are rela-
tively underdeveloped in United States. It's unfortunate that it took
a natural disaster to demonstrate how much work needs to
be done.
We need to have a structure setup for this kind of disaster and
be ready for it. It's not extraordinary that the patient came to the
hospital and was misdiagnosed. Most clinicians have never seen
[Ebola] before so it's not that hard to believe that it was missed.
What is hard to believe is that the electronic health record was
blamed. It is clear that [the history] was recorded by a nurse in a
certain section of the health record, and the physician did not pick
up on it.
What that says to me is that the health record can be better.
One of the themes of my new book is how IT changes the nature of
our workﬂow and communication. I can easily envision what
happened in that emergency room: the nurse captured the
information, recorded it in the electronic health record and moved
onto the next task. We have this idea that when one types
something into the health record, they are done. I think we have
got to get past that and think differently about how we use
electronic health records, and when we still need to communicate
the old fashioned way.
Healthcare: Do you view these events surrounding Ebola as a
new class of medical error?
Wachter: I think this is just a diagnostic error, but one with
two new dimensions:
One dimension is that the error has consequences that are far
greater than the usual. They don't just affect the individual but can
impact everyone else exposed to it. We have faced that issue
before with contagious diseases like tuberculosis. However, the
consequences of a missed diagnosis here are potentially far
greater.
The second dimension is the electronic medical record and the
degree to which it changes workﬂow and communication pat-
terns. We used to believe that the electronic health record would
be our savior for all kinds of mistakes. However, what we are
learning, which in retrospect is not that surprising, is that the EHR
is capable of generating new kinds of mistakes; some of which are
pretty powerful.
Healthcare: Information Technology, Interoperability, Public
Health, and Ebola: Can it, will it, and should it change things
going forth?
Wachter: Eventually I think it will but the challenge is that
most of us had never seen a case. At the public health and
epidemiological level, the system must be made aware of new
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risks that front-line clinicians everywhere need to assess. How
good are we at decision support and triggering alerts to a clinician
that when a patient has risk factors “A” and “B” together, that we
need to think about “X”? We haven't thought about how to do that
without creating alert fatigue. We need to balance sensitivity and
speciﬁcity to deliver the alerts in ways that are actionable and
practical.
In some ways, we are not even good at basic Decision Support
101. Asking us to layer in more dynamic decision support, that
changes quickly that changes over the space of a couple days, we
need to get there. But to me, that will be a decade long process.
If you go the next step: Why is it that you need a doctor or
nurse to even ask about travel to Liberia? In a world with truly
seamless interoperability of big data, with Epic talking to Quest
talking to Athena, one could envision our electronic health records
talking to passport control. You don't have to ask about travel; the
system would know that. The number of steps between now and
there, however – that's fantasy right now.
Healthcare: You mentioned some challenges with computer-
ized medicine and building adequate decision support. Do you
believe we are headed in the right direction or is it time to
reevaluate the tools we have?
Wachter: We have to do this. We have to ﬁgure out how to
computerize the healthcare system. When you hear about errors
caused by funky computer systems and people ignoring alerts,
there is an instinctive longing for the old days, but most of it is
fantasy. The old system wasn't safe. We couldn't read each other's
handwriting. There were no alerts and we would miss things.
Patients were killed because of medication errors; people didn't
know their patients' were allergic to medicines and so we
prescribed them. There was no way I could follow what my
residents were doing if I was at home or out of the building.
And so, it can't be that the right call is to go back to pen and paper.
Even as we see clunky things in the computers, there is no
question in my mind that my hospital is safer now that it is digital
than when it was analog.
Is there a way to get fromwhere we are now to nirvana without
all of the uncomfortable, and sometimes dangerous, steps along
the way? I'm not sure. I think there is some bumping around that
we almost have to do in order to get there.
What I do think is that we are learning to be smarter and
anticipate some of the problems before they bite us. I think alerts
are a perfect example of the problem. At my hospital, the cardiac
monitors in seventy ICU beds go off 2.5 million times in a month.
There is an audible alert every eight minutes. One of the nurses in
the ICU was asked: What would make you nervous about your
patient? She said “silence.” That says that something is really
screwed up and that we have not given deep thought to how you
alert people in a way that it is productive. Part of that is because
we have disassociated the process of developing the computer
system and end-users. We have to ﬁgure out a way of integrating
the people who are developing the computer systems and the
users so that when we come up with these ideas that sound great
in a PowerPoint presentation or a brieﬁng book, we actually test it
and see what it looks like when you use it in real life.
That was one of the most striking lessons for me that came
from spending a day Boeing seeing how their computer engineers
thought about cockpit design. I don't think their engineers are any
smarter than ours are. But before they release a design, before they
actually build it into a Boeing cockpit, they just test the hell out of
it. Both in simulation and in real life with test pilots to see: “This
thing sounds like a really good idea, but in real life it doesn't really
work that well because it's over-alerting people and it's distracting
them.” That is the kind of work that we have not yet built into
healthcare computer development.
For example, when we computerized radiology, all of a sudden,
without any forethought, people stopped going down to radiology
department to talk to the radiologist. The relationships with
radiologists were really useful. What sorts of structures and type
of culture, do we need to make sure the hospitalists and radi-
ologists still talk to each other? If we had learned to ask those
kinds of questions, I think we could have mitigated some of the
harm, not all of it, but some harm.
That is basically what I have learned and am trying to promote:
How do we both make the technology better but also try to
understand culture, workﬂow, personnel, and communication
patterns? How are they going to be changed by technology and
how do we create systems that take advantage of the technology?
To use it as a tool without screwing up the rest of the things we
need to deliver good and safe health care.
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